Feminist expertise at the margin of the state: the Comité du travail féminin and the genesis of equal employment policy in France (1965-1983)

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Abstract

In France as in many other western countries, the promotion of women’s status started being formally asserted as a public policy goal in the 1960s, leading to the creation of governmental structures specifically devoted to this aim. While deprived of any formal power or significant means of intervention, these agencies nonetheless contributed in bringing women’s rights issues on the political agenda. Focusing on the first such agency, the Comité du travail féminin (Women’s labor committee), and its role in the genesis of equal employment policy, I offer an explanation for this apparent contradiction between women’s policy agencies lack of formal power and their contribution to the furthering of women’s rights, by exploring the role of critical expertise as a leverage to transform public policy from within.
Introduction

Equal employment never has been, in France, the subject of similar mobilizations as what took place, for example, in the US or in Canada, where the women’s movement involvement on the issue was substantial, notably by means of legal mobilization strategies (Burstein 1991; McCann 1994). In France, there was no such mobilization of the Courts as a field of struggle in favor of equal employment. Women’s movement strategies were more classical legal reform strategies (Mazur 1995). Moreover, paradoxically enough, equal employment was not a core issue of mobilization for the women’s movement when a formal, highly visible equal employment policy started being implemented at the beginning of the 1980s. While the genesis of equal employment policy cannot be clearly linked to direct movement pressure, women’s policy agencies, here defined as state organizations endowed with the specific mission of promoting women’s rights and interests (Mc Bride Stetson et Mazur 1995), played a significant role in its definition. For example, the 1983 bill that formally initiated “equal employment policy” as such is strongly associated with the name of Yvette Roudy, who had been appointed minister in charge of women’s rights in 1981 within the socialist government (Jenson et Sineau 1995). However, while being formally labeled as ‘equal employment policy’ in the beginning of the 1980s, its main provisions were conceived and discussed earlier in the 1970s. Another, much less known agency, the Comité du travail féminin (CTF), was involved in these earlier stages of labor law reforms and attempts to policy definition. First created in 1965 under the name “Comité d’étude et de liaison des problèmes du travail féminin” (Study and link Committee on women’s labor issues), and turned into “Comité du travail féminin” (Women’s labor Committee) in 1971, the CTF is a small advisory body comprised of members appointed among women’s and family organizations, trade unions and employer’s organizations, as well as members selected for their expertise on women’s labor issues. Until 1981, it undertakes research on various aspects of women’s work (i.e. training, work conditions, pay, unemployment), leading to recommendations to governments. How can this Committee’s contribution to the definition of equal employment policy be characterized? Based upon this general interrogation, the purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) to shed light on some aspect of the genesis of equal employment policy in France, and 2) to explore the logics of action of women’s policy agencies, by means of a particular example, that of the CTF. By focusing on the contribution of a particular institution to the definition of equal employment policy, the paper, following McBride Stetson and Mazur’s approach, examines
“state feminism” from a public policy perspective (Mc Bride Stetson et Mazur 1995); however, our approach departs from theirs in being meso-level, with a strong ethnographic concern.

Indeed, whereas the first studies of “state feminism”, notably coming from Australia, had a microsociological orientation, focusing on the personal experiences and political dilemmas of “femocrats” (leaders in charge of women’s policy) (Eisenstein 1996; Franzway, Court, et Connell 1989), Mazur and Stetson’s Research network on gender, politics and the state (RNGS) develops a macro, comparative perspective on state feminism, analyzing women’s policy agencies (WPAs) from a public policy perspective (Mazur 2001; Mazur et McBride 2006; Mc Bride Stetson et Mazur 1995; McBride Stetson 2001; Outshoorn 2004). Based upon an acknowledgement of the fact that WPAs do not define women’s policy on their own, rather try to influence public policy defined by other state agencies, the RNGS approach to state feminism consists in analyzing policy debates of particular relevance in view of gender equality (such as job training, political representation, abortion or prostitution), in order to assess whether, among all the policy actors involved, WPAs played an important role or not.

The focus, therefore, is on public problems and agenda-setting, in a classical public policy analysis approach – the question being: to what extent do WPAs contribute in agenda-setting and public problem definition on gender issues? Meanwhile, other studies of state feminism adopt a more institutional perspective, focusing on the institutions rather than their contributions to the definition of particular policies (Malloy 2003; Pal 1993). Finally, the experience of feminist activists within the state remains another focus of inquiry (Banaszak 2005; 2006). The aim of this paper is to bridge these two (macro-level and micro-level) bodies of literature, by showing how the ethnographic study of a particular agency can shed light on the particular social processes by which problem definition and agenda-setting occur.

The ethnographic work involved here is mostly historical: its aim is to offer a detailed description of the Committee’s internal debates and logics of action – which is made possible by the institution’s rather rich archives, which include not only its reports and recommendations to governments as well as its news bulletin, but also meeting minutes and draft works of the organization’s various thematic commissions. The archive work was complemented by six interviews with former Committee members or employees.

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Whereas focusing on a particular institution has proven useful in the analysis of agenda setting (Burstein et al. 1997; Burstein, Bricher, et al. 1995), studies that concentrate on particular women’s policy agencies, or antidiscrimination policy agencies more broadly speaking, generally examine them from two partly overlapping points of views: their role in women’s organizing (Pal 1993) and their role in policy implementation (Bonastia 2000; Pedriana et Stryker 2004). The focus here is not on policy implementation but on policy definition: how did these institutions contribute in the definition of gender equality policy?

Admittedly, unlike a more classical public problems approach that focuses on a particular issue and analyzes the actors involved in agenda-setting and policymaking, the focus on a particular institution prevents from drawing any precise conclusion so as to the extent of the institution’s role (which always runs the risk of being overestimated); our aim here is not to quantify policy influence (at best, conclusions can be drawn regarding the existence of some influence), but to characterize it from a more qualitative point of view. More specifically, the focus of this paper will be on the production and use of critical expertise as a leverage to transform public policy from within. By critical expertise, I refer to the use of expert data and discourse as a leverage to criticize existing laws and policies and promote reforms. Critical expertise is a key political tool for the CTF because it permits the formulation of criticism while remaining in a strictly governmental repertoire.

From a strictly institutional perspective, women’s policy agencies are generally described as marginal and weak, suffering from a lack of means (Malloy 2003). But once linked to a public policy analysis perspective, the very signs based upon which weakness was diagnosed may appear as assets in view of policy influence. In substance, this article shows how standing at the margin of the state and with a strong interface with civil society, while being a sign of institutional weakness, can turn out an asset in terms of policy influence.

The first part of the paper unfolds the paradox between, on the one hand, the Committee’s general lack of means of functioning and formal powers, and on the other hand, its contribution to some key legal reforms. The rest of the paper offers to contribute to solving this contradiction by exploring the role of critical expertise in the Committee’s activities. In the second part, this critical expertise and the way it is used by the organization are presented. The last part of the paper analyzes the social basis of this expertise by means of an inquiry into the members’ professional and activist profiles, as well as an analysis of how the Committee’s direct interface with the political process favors the production of policy-relevant knowledge.
The policy influence of a weak institution

Following a similar pattern as the paradox described by Pedriana and Stryker regarding the EEOC (Pedriana et Stryker 2004), the Comité’s influence appears in sharp contrast with its lacking the main characteristics generally associated with “state capacity”: budget, formal power, etc. Admittedly, unlike the EEOC, it is not responsible for implementing policy, but it could be assumed that even a mere consultative role requires resources, of which the CTF is quite deprived. Given this general absence of resources, the committee’s longevity, regular work and its production of reports are a surprise in themselves. Moreover, the Committee exerts some (however limited) influence on the political process, in spite of its absence of formal power.

A marginal actor in the department of Labor

To understand the Committee’s marginal position within the department of labor, it is necessary to go back to the circumstances of its creation. The creation of what was conceived by its promoters as a French equivalent of the US Women’s Bureau was indeed pressed upon the ministry of labor by a regrouping of right-wing women’s rights activists lead by Marcelle Devaud, the CILAF (Comité international de liaison des associations féminines, or International Women’s associations linking committee). This mobilization, in many ways, finds its roots in the broader context of the short surge of women’s activism that took place, in France, right after women were granted the right to vote in 1944 (Chaperon 2000). Indeed, several women’s organizations were then created, following party lines, in order to promote women’s political participation. Among them, the Françaises libres (Free French women), which later became the CILAF, aimed at gathering “non-communist” women\(^2\). Co-founder of the Françaises libres, Marcelle Devaud was also one of the first women to be elected at the Republican Council (Conseil de la République, the ancestor of the Senate) in 1946, where she stood as the vice-president of the Republican Freedom Party (Parti républicain de la liberté), a small right-wing group of fifteen members, and remained until 1958. Her double affiliation, as an elected member of a political party and leader of a women’s organization, was certainly an asset in her lobby in favor of the creation of a Women’s Bureau – a campaign she initiated in 1952, after visiting the US Women’s Bureau.

After 13 years of unsuccessful attempts, the CILAF finally obtained in 1965 from labor minister Gilbert Grandval (appointed in 1962, and whom Marcelle Devaud personally knew) the creation of a Comité d’étude et de liaison des problèmes du travail féminin (Study and link Committee on women’s labor issues). Therefore, the Committee was not conceived within the Department of labor, but created as a result of activist pressure, and it was, to a large extent, conceded to Marcelle Devaud as a favor\(^3\). These circumstances help explain the Comité’s marginal status within the department of labor.

The Committee existed legally before it existed for real: a decree created it in September, 1965, and another one reformed it in March, 1966, before it actually held its first meeting on April, 29\(^{\text{th}}\), 1966\(^4\). It had very few material and human means. It never had a budget of its own. In 1966, it was given small offices in an annex of the Department of Labor, “halfway in a passing corridor”:

«As we started off, we practically had no means. We were given offices in the Department of Labour, it was awful. […] We were in an annex of the Department with low ceilings, halfway in a corridor where people were passing by… We were really the “poor of the house”” (interview 5).

Its human resources were very limited, with only one full-time employee (the “Secretary general”) in the beginning. In 1971, two additional people were employed in what became the Comité’s “permanent office” (Secrétariat permanent), as well as two others appointed to the newly created documentation centre. All these employees of the Committee (all of them were women) were recruited on a contractual basis specifically for this task; they previously were not public servants of the Department. According to them, their pay and employment status were lower than what they could have hoped for in other services of the Department of Labour. As they complained about this, they were offered to work for another service with a better pay – which they collectively refused:

«I came to work for the Committee on what they call a third category contract [i.e one of the lowest categories, when I had received higher education]. They said: take it or leave it. So I took it. To console me, they said: if you want to go and work for another service where they deal with other issues, you will get a higher category contract. So we waged a war. We decided that we would stay with the Committee, and demand an improvement of our contracts within the Committee. We fought all the time we were there to obtain this.[…] When we asked for that

\(^3\) As Marcelle Devaud puts it in her biography, Gilbert Grandval agreed to the creation of a Committee « half because he was interested in the project, half to be nice to me (pour m’être agréable) ». V. MAN. (1997). Marcelle Devaud. Itinéraire exceptionnel d’une femme politique française, Paris: Carvalho. p. 67..

\(^4\) Arrêté ministériel du 29 septembre 1965 portant création d’un Comité d’étude et de liaison des problèmes du travail féminin ; Arrêté du 11 mars 1966 relatif au Comité d’étude et de liaison des problèmes du travail féminin.
improvement, we were offered to go and work for another service. And we refused, we collectively refused: this shows you the spirit we had. [...] We collectively refused to fare better individually by going to work elsewhere. So we completely had integrated the fight for recognition by our head ministry, the Department of Labour, of the value of our work. That is, we believed that working on women’s issues shouldn’t be paid less than working on social security or other issues [...] But we lost” (interview 3).

This not only illustrates the Committee’s marginal situation within the department of Labor, but also testifies to the commitment of its staff – which, as will be shown below, contributes to explaining its influence.

Moreover, the Committee’s formal powers are inexistent. As an advisory Committee, it has no coercive power; it can only give advice to its head department, conduct studies and give information on women’s labor. In return, the Department of Labor exerts very limited control over the Committee’s activities. According to the first decrees governing it, the Committee is not explicitly expected to account for its actions and modes of organization to the ministry. It is not supposed to ask for the ministry’s agreement before deciding to work on a particular topic, or regarding the way it organizes itself. No formal mechanism of submission by the ministry is provided for. However this changes slightly 1971, when, along with the further means allotted to the Committee, more precise means of control by the ministry are established: the Department of Labor’s general head for labor and employment (Directeur général du travail et de l’emploi) is appointed vice-president of the Committee, and the Committee must submit a presentation of its work and agenda, as well as an annual report, to the minister. Finally, the ministry can command the Committee to work on specific subjects or give advice on a draft bill in preparation. But generally speaking, the decrees governing the Committee (see frame 1) provide for few formal means of control over its work. How did these legal provisions translate in the Committee’s daily operating? As its meeting minutes show, the Committee is very autonomous in the definition of its agenda and its operating mode. The subjects tackled, however linked to the governmental and parliamentary agenda, are the result of debates among members, much more than suggestions coming from the ministry – although Labor ministers present speeches to the Committee about once a year, sometimes pointing to subjects they would like the organization to work on. However, this freedom of speech within the Committee is severely limited by de facto restrictions placed on the publicity of its work until 1971. But apart from this initial restriction, the Committee generally is very free to define its agenda and stands as it chose; rather than denouncing a form of control from the department of Labor, former members complain about the latter’s indifference:
"We were both free and suffering from a form of indifference. We had that kind of freedom that is sometimes the price to pay for not being taken into account. So it wasn’t a very positive kind of freedom, coming from them. Now, what we did of this freedom was something else. I think we used this freedom in an extremely rich way. So it was this kind of situation" (interview 3).

Indeed, in spite of its structural weakness within the department of Labor, the Committee used its freedom to make a significant contribution to the evolution of labor laws in a more egalitarian sense, as well as raise awareness on equal employment issues.

Promoting equality

The creation of the CTF occurs in an ambivalent context in terms of public policies related to gender, work and the family (Commaille 1993; Jenson et Sineau 2001; Revillard 2006). Admittedly, France has an old tradition of social policies that take for granted mothers’ labor force participation (a paid maternity leave was created as early as 1913), as opposed to countries such as the UK and the US where the first social policies defined a distinct citizenship for women, based on a “separate spheres” model (Cova 1997; Jenson 1986; 1989; Morgan 2002). However, the “family policy” defined in the aftermath of WWII contradicted this working mothers model (Lenoir 2003). Indeed, the main provision in this new policy was a “single pay allowance” that aimed at keeping mothers at home (Martin 1998). This traditional male breadwinner model promoted by the family policy was, in turn, challenged by employment policies: in the 1950s and 1960s, France suffers from a labor force shortage, which governments try to remedy by resorting to immigrant labor and, to a lesser extent, women’s labor. This results in “contradictory injunctions” as far as mothers’ employment is concerned (Commaille 2001), between a family policy promoting a stay-at-home mothers model, and an employment policy that started to encourage women’s (part-time and underpaid) labor force participation.

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The way the Committee’s mission is defined in its founding decree well reflects these ambivalences: indeed, waged labor is both characterized as a source of “problems” for women, and as something that needs to be encouraged:

"[The Committee is to] examine the problems that waged labor entails for women and study measures that may facilitate their paid employment and their advancement within their occupation". 

Endowed with this ambiguously defined mission, what stance did the Committee hold regarding women’s labor, and what “measures” did it recommend?

While only representing a minority, the “problems” perspective, following whose logic women’s (and especially mothers’) waged labor is regarded with skepticism, being a source of “problems”, is not totally absent from the Committee. Indeed, one of the first commissions that are created within the committee to tackle specific topics is a commission dealing with “the problems faced by women workers with family responsibilities”, in which Ménie Grégoire, famous journalist and member of the Committee, drafts a very controversial report on “the impact of women’s work on women and the family”. As other members express fear about the political impact of a report that suggest a mother’s paid work during the first three years of a child could be damaging to both, the report never gets any publicity outside of the Committee.

By contrast, this episode reveals the prevalence, within Committee members, of a perspective according to which women’s (including young mothers’) labor should be encouraged. And in fact, the activities of this later renamed “work-family reconciliation” commission subsequently focus on the “services and equipment for active women”, notably tackling the availability of day-care services for young children.

But beyond simply promoting women’s labor force participation, the Committee promotes gender equality, thereby departing from the “protective” tradition in women’s labor policy (Lévy 1988; Lurol 1999; Mazur 1995). This egalitarian stance never is theorized as such, but it can be deduced from the Committee’s recommendations in the various reports it submits to its head department over the years: equality functions as the dominant legal frame behind all

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7 Comité du travail féminin, meeting minutes, April, 22th, 1966.

these recommendations (Pedriana 2006) (see frame 2). The content of this equality frame, in turn, must be specified.

In the Comité’s stance, equality first refers to the fight against direct discrimination, be it explicitly supported by law or not. In the books, the Comité tracks down all remaining legal provisions that may exclude women from some jobs, especially in the public service. Its lobbying leads to the adoption of a 1975 law that, while not suppressing all derogations to the general principle of equal access to recruitment procedures in the public service, restricts them more severely. Moreover, the Committee promotes laws that explicitly prohibit direct gender discrimination in various aspects of employment: hiring, terms and conditions of employment, access to training, promotion. Early on, its efforts in this respect focus on equal pay: as early as 1967, the Committee submits to the department of labor a draft bill on equal pay, promoting equal pay for equal work and equal pay for work of equal worth. This translates, in 1972, into the first major equal pay law, whose implementation remains insufficient, according to the Committee’s assessment.

Beyond equal treatment in the law, the Committee focuses its efforts on job training, in compliance with a consensus, among Committee members, around a particular explanation of job inequalities that links them to women’s inadequate training. In terms of initial training, beyond legally opening girls’ access to the various tracks, the Committee seeks to explain why girls keep choosing traditional tracks, notably looking at the role of guidance counselors. Regarding adult job training, the Committee tries, with limited success, to favor the representation of “women’s interests” within the training advisory boards that are being set up at the time.

Therefore, without explicitly referring to “equal employment”, the Comité promotes a combination of antidiscrimination legal devices and job training policy that actually form the basis of what will be officially defined at the beginning of the 1980s as “equal employment policy” (politique d’égalité professionnelle). It achieves significant legal reforms, such as the 1972 equal pay law and the 1975 law on equal access to jobs in the public service. Moreover, it takes part in the contemporary transformation of family policy from a male-breadwinner model to a “reconciliation” model where mothers’ employment is facilitated, notably by means of the day-care system. However, this “reconciliation” model also has a darker side in view of gender equality, which limits the Committee’s influence. Indeed, part-time work and long, unpaid “family leaves” are also encouraged, by means of legal provisions, in the name

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9 Loi n°75-599 du 10 juillet 1975.
of “reconciliation”; this results in underemployment for women. In spite of significant efforts, the Committee fails in its attempts to oppose these trends (it officially criticizes, in 1969 and 1979, draft bills that favour the development of part-time work, as well as the 1977 draft bill on “mothers’ leave”). To sum up, the Comité is more successful in its strategies that strictly target the professional sphere (notably equal pay) than in its attempts to influence the policy provisions adopted in the name of work-family reconciliation. Its long term influence in terms of equal employment appears even more clearly in view of the equal employment policy that starts being implemented in 1981, a policy whose founding principles, equal pay and job training, were already set up by the Committee’s activities.

This short and long term influence appears in sharp contrast with the Committee’s meagre means of functioning and lack of formal power. The aim of this paper is to contribute to solving this contradiction by exploring the role of critical expertise in the Committee’s activities. First, I present this critical expertise and the way it is used by the organization; I then analyze the social basis of this expertise by means of an inquiry into the members’ professional and activist profiles, as well as an analysis of how the Committee’s direct interface with the political process favors the production of policy-relevant knowledge.

Critical expertise as a political tool

Initially labelled “study and link Committee on the problems of women’s labor”, the Comité du travail féminin first and foremost defines itself as an expert organization. This is very clear in the words of Committee president Marcelle Devaud, describing her conception of the organization on the latter’s first meeting in April, 1966:

“This is not an academy, devoted to eloquence and literature; it is not an activist organization, however legitimate some demands may be. Neither is it a service of the Department of Labor […]. Finally, the Committee’s vocation is not political; its purpose is to tackle problems in a technical and scientific way, with rigorous objectivity11”.

The expert ethos also appears very clearly in the discourse of former employees of the organization, who insist they were there to “produce (expert) material”, both for Committee members and for the general public:

Q: Concretely, what did your work consist in?
A: What was my work? I had commissions I had to attend to… I produced material. I, what I did, I produced material. That is, a subject was chosen, and I had to manage with it. Each commission, a different subject. So I prepared material, identified the actors, the parties involved… (Interview 4)

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11 Comité du travail féminin, meeting minutes, April, 22th, 1966, p.6.
In another excerpt, the value put on expertise appears in the way a former employee recalls how she was trained to better standards of accuracy by one of the CTF’s most prominent members, Marguerite Thibert:

“I had the great privilege to work with this great woman (Grande dame), who had worked at the International labor organization. […] She was extraordinary: when a new bill was passed and I handed her the press release from the ministry’s communication services, she would toss it in the garbage and say: “Get me the bill”” (Interview 3).

How can we make sense of this attachment to expertise? The latter can first be explained from the point of view of the CTF’s legitimacy as an organization. However, expertise also plays a more political, strategic role in view of the Committee’s promotion of equal employment.

Having been created as a result of activist pressure, and being invested by women’s rights advocates (as will be developed below), the CTF could fear being discredited for its activism. As its material conditions of activity show, its legitimacy within the department of Labor was far from obvious. Committee members and staff therefore felt they had to gain their legitimacy within the public administration (Rogers-Dillon et Skrentny 1999), and expertise was a key asset in this perspective (Stryker 1994; 2000). Indeed, as Marcelle Devaud’s earlier quotation clearly illustrates, the “technical and scientific” approach, and “rigorous objectivity” are a way for the Committee to distinguish itself from an “activist organization”. Moreover, Committee staff and members may also be prone to insist on the scientific-technical dimension of their work to make up for their lack of legitimacy as women12, in the context of a public administration whose higher management remains strongly masculine, and whose dominant values (built upon the figure of the factory worker) are socially connoted as masculine. Therefore, the stress on expertise first has internal reasons, as a way to increase the legitimacy of a women’s lead, easily deemed activist organization.

There is, however, a more political rationale behind the Committee’s expert stance. Its investment in expertise is not only defensive, but also strategic in view of its promotion of equal employment. Indeed, however strongly the Committee discards its assimilation to an activist organization, it nonetheless acts as a pressure group within its head department, criticizing existing or planned laws and policies and promoting reforms. While this critical stance may seem hard to uphold in view of the organization’s governmental status, critical

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12 A few men are members of the CTF, but the president, Secretary general, staff and most prominent members are women.
expertise is precisely what enables it to combine its role as a pressure group while remaining in its expected role as a governmental agency.

By critical expertise, I refer to the use of expert data and discourse as a leverage to criticize existing laws and policies and promote reforms. Critical expertise is a key political tool for the CTF because it permits the formulation of criticism while remaining in a strictly governmental repertoire (since expertise is the bureaucracy’s natural mode of expression). As such, expertise is one of the main strategies within what could be labelled as a broader “governmental repertoire of contention” which includes other strategies such as letters to ministers or meetings with heads of the department of Labor (Revillard 2007b).

The expertise mobilized by the CTF is both legal and sociological, each type of expertise being represented by a different commission within the Committee, the “legislation” commission and the “work conditions” commission. Critical legal expertise consists in a critical examination of existing law, as well as the mobilization of foreign legal examples and international/supranational (often soft) laws as a leverage to promote reforms at the national level. For example, in its defence of an equal pay law in 1967, the Committee referred to both article 119 of the Rome treaty (“equal pay for equal work”) and convention n°100 of the ILO (“equal pay for work of equal worth”) to promote a law that would assert a combination of the two principles. Moreover, in a typical example of a boomerang effect (Keck et Sikkink 1998), leaders of the Committee took part in the definition of European equal employment legislation (notably the 1976 directive on equal treatment), which they later used as a means of pressure on the French government. The early creation of a sub-group on “international and foreign laws” within the Committee’s “legislation” commission, where this legal expertise unfolds, illustrates the importance of an international perspective.

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13 According to Robin Stryker, this type of organization would be expected to induce conflict within the Committee R. STRYKER. (2000). "Legitimacy processes as institutional politics: implications for theory and research in the sociology of organizations." Research in the sociology of organizations, vol.17, p. 179-223, p. . We haven’t found any clear evidence of such conflict, maybe because the ideological sources of conflict are more prominent, and actors’ commitment to women’s rights supersedes their professional ethos. Moreover, the commissions system is a very loose organization, with no administrative grounding.


granted to these international and transnational dynamics in the Committee’s reform strategies.

This legal commission has a sociological counterpart, the “work conditions” commission. The latter is the basis for the other type of critical expertise developed by the Committee, sociological expertise. While the Committee doesn’t have the administrative capacity to develop its very own expertise on women’s labor, its approach is twofold: it promotes the production of gender-specific data by the organizations that are traditionally in charge of producing statistics and data on labor and education (i.e. the departments of Labor and Education, the national statistics institute (INSEE)), and it contributes to the diffusion of knowledge on women’s labor.

A good example of the impulse given to the production of gender-specific data comes from a 1972 report on job training, in which the Committee publishes a list of recent governmental publications that omit to break down their figures according to gender. Similarly, a former Committee employee recalls constantly bugging INSEE researchers in order to get systematic gender break-down of data (interview 4).

In what sense is this sociological expertise “critical”? The critical role of sociological expertise is twofold, and in a way, ambiguous. On the one hand, knowledge on job inequalities is used to promote gender equality legislation. For example, statistics regarding pay inequality help make the point in favor of equal pay legislation. Similarly, the CTF pushes the development of gender-specific data regarding access to training in order to legitimize the need for a more efficient job training policy for women. But on the other hand, data about women’s labor is also used to show how important women’s labor force participation is, and how inescapable the increase thereof. For example, this is how a former Secretary general of the Committee sums up the organization’s contribution:

“[Referring to the CTF years] I think it was a key moment in the lives of women. Of course, afterwards, there were ups and downs [in women’s labor force participation]. But this evolution was so strong, you couldn’t… [...] You could not do anything against it… On the contrary, it had to be accompanied. So the Committee's role was to get the government, the unions, the employers, to realize that this was written in History, that they would have to do with it and make sure it would be as well organized as possible for women” (Interview 1).

16 Comité du travail féminin, Formation professionnelle (rapport de la commission), p.48. CAC. 19860111, art. 9.
17 Comité du travail féminin, Formation professionnelle (rapport de la commission), p.48. CAC. 19860111, art. 9.
Here, women’s increased labor force participation and job advancement are presented, on the basis of sociological/historical expertise, as something “you cannot do anything against”; the political goal behind this narrative, as implied in this quotation, is to convince political actors that any policy going against this trend is doomed to fail. Here, sociological expertise is also used as a political tool (to prevent a conservative backlash), in a way that may appear in contradiction with the previous denunciation of gender inequalities: indeed, the stress is put on women’s participation and achievement on the labor market, not on gender inequalities. This, in turn, shows how sociological expertise on women’s labor can be variously used within specific political strategies.

In the absence of any significant resources of formal power, how was this critical expertise produced, and what do these social conditions help us understand about the link between critical expertise and policy influence? The social basis of the Committee’s critical expertise will be analyzed in the light of the organization’s role in the building of an epistemic community.

The formation of an epistemic community

Admittedly, the Committee was not alone in promoting equal employment reforms; it was part of a broader epistemic community (Haas 1992) including lawyers, sociologists, some unions and women’s movements, as well as higher public servants. However, I argue that the CTF gave a decisive impulse to the building of this epistemic community – and, more generally speaking, of an equal employment policy community (Mazur 1995), for two main reasons. First, it created a link between previously rather isolated equal employment advocates. Beyond the gathering of people the Committee constituted by means of its members and staff, this link was made possible by concrete devices such as the Committee’s documentation centre, its news bulletin and organization of seminars. Second, because it gave these people a direct access to the political process, it facilitated the production of “policy-relevant” knowledge, that could influence public policy.

A network of equal employment activists and researchers

Created as a result of activist pressure, the Committee was invested by women’s rights advocates, by means of its members as well as the small permanent staff that was recruited starting in 1971.
Members designated on the basis of their competence on women’s labor constituted the Committee’s main source of expertise. Among them are Madeleine Guilbert, famous sociologist and a pioneer in the study of women’s work (Maruani 2001; Maruani et Rogerat 1999), who presides the “work conditions” commission; Simone Veil, then a judge, who presides the “legislation” commission until her appointment as minister of Health in 1975 (as such, she introduced the 1975 bill establishing the right to abortion); Marguerite Thibert, historian and women’s rights activist, who had worked for the ILO where, in 1928, she was appointed to a new unit in charge of women’s issues; Jeanne Chaton, pacifist and historian, who also formerly worked for the ILO and was appointed French representative to the UN Commission on the status of women at the same time as she was appointed to the CTF. Therefore, these members provide the Committee with privileged ties with international organizations such as the UN and the ILO, whose soft law is used as a leverage to promote reforms at the national level.

But beyond these “qualified” members, who are appointed based on their formal “competence” on women’s labor, unions and employer representatives, as well as women’s organization representatives, also provide the Committee with different forms of expertise

Among the former are prominent women’s rights advocates, who were pioneers in the promotion of women’s rights within unions, such as Madeleine Colin and Christiane Gilles (CGT), or Jeannette Laot (CFDT). Some of the employers representatives were also women, and were active members of the Committee: one can name Raymonde Nousbaum and Renée Villebrun, from the main employers organization, the CNPF.

Finally, women’s organizations were also key sources of legal and sociological expertise. The organizations that are represented are, for the most part, organizations that date back to the beginning of the century (such as the catholic Union feminine civique et sociale (UFCS) and the jewish-protestant Conseil national des femmes françaises (CNFF)) or the post-war era (such as the right-wing CILAF and the communist Union des femmes françaises (UFF)). The only more recent organization is the Jeunes femmes movement, a regrouping of protestant

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18 Regarding the role of civil society organizations such as unions and women’s organization, it is important to stress that these developed their own lobbying strategies, and did not exert any formal pressure on the Committee to echo their stances. Accordingly, members’ stands were influenced by the organizations they belonged to, but I found no trace of a collective use of the Committee by these organizations within their own reforms strategies. Thereby, the Committee cannot be analyzed as a simple cog in the machine, opening political opportunities H. KITSCHELT. (1986). “Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies.” British Journal of Political Science, vol.16, n.1, p. 57-85, p. for social movements which, in the last resort, would control it; its activities have a meaning in their own. Similarly, there is no trace of any attempt, on the part of the Committee, to influence women’s organizing, as would be expected in a classical cooptation model P. SELZNICK. (1966). TVA and the grassroots. A study in the sociology of formal organization. New York: Harper. p.
women that develops in the second half of the 1960s. The “second wave”, more radical feminist movement that emerges in the beginning of the 1970s is not represented – which is not surprising in view of its radical stance, that contradicts the CTF’s reform strategy, its leftism as well as its general refusal of state representation. Moreover, the core issues of mobilization for this movement are abortion and birth control, not equal employment.

As for the organizations that are represented, in spite of their many (religious, political) cleavages, they provide the CTF with useful expertise. For example, the CNFF, where lawyers play a leading role, has an old tradition of critical analysis of existing legislation and advocacy for legal reforms since the beginning of the century (Cohen 2006). Mass organizations such as the UFF and the UFCS provide the Committee with a more sociological form of expertise, notably based upon the surveys they often conduct among their members. Not only do these members provide the Committee with much needed legal and sociological expertise on women’s work, but their personal commitment to the promotion of women’s rights also explains why they choose to benevolently work for the committee, taking part in meetings, searching for information and drafting reports. Until 1971, the Committee has only one permanent employee (the Secretary General) to support their work. Starting in 1971, four more people come to work for the Committee, and they, as well, are all women’s rights advocates. In the interviews I conducted with them, they all referred to some form of previous feminist commitment, be it in their scholarly work, their professional activity, the participation in a women’s organization, or even to the women’s liberation movement for one of them. This explains the amount of energy and time they devoted to their work for the Committee – which, in turn, sheds light on the latter’s accomplishment in spite of such reduced means of functioning. Several of them talked about their “passion” for their work for the CTF:

“People got very low pays, there were very few means. Simply, everybody was passionate about what they did. That was the motivation » (interview 2).

“The Committee was a wonderful place, it was incredibly efficient, because each of us really was an activist. We were completely passionate about the subject” (Interview 3).

Finally, beyond its prominent members and its staff, who can be characterized as “institutional activists” (Santoro et McGuire 1997), the Committee also created a network between “outside” equal employment researchers and activists by means of devices such as its documentation centre (which was open to the public, and notably to researchers and

19 For example, the « work-family reconciliation » commission uses the UFF’s figures regarding housing and equipments: CAC, 19860111, art.14.
journalists concerned by women’s work) and the hearings it organized on a regular basis, inviting experts on a particular subject to present their work. Therefore, the Committee created a link between previously isolated women’s rights advocates, and this gathering of activists is what gave a decisive impulse to the production and circulation of critical expertise.

*Information devices in support of the building of an epistemic community*

While facilitated by the gathering of people the Committee constituted, the building of an epistemic community on women’s work also rested on more concrete information devices, such as a documentation centre, a news bulletin and the organization of seminars. Early on, members had requested that a librarian/researcher be assigned to the Committee, in support of their work. In 1970, in the context of a broader governmental reflection on the need to create an information centre for women, the Committee’s Secretary general lobbied in favor of the creation of such a structure within the Committee, arguing that “this source of information would contribute to insure the relevance of [the Committee’s] diagnosis and the impact of its action”. The amount of discussion and lobbying taking place around this issue signals how politically important the creation of a documentation centre was. This creation was obtained in 1971, and in fact, the centre turned out an important support for the Committee’s expertise, as well as a key device in order to spread the latter (notably by means of its research and advisory reports) as well as attract journalists, researchers, students, thereby participating in the building of an epistemic community.

The Committee’s second main medium of information is its news bulletin, edited from 1972 to 1980 (with an average of 3 bulletins per year). The bulletin comprises of information of Committee’s activities, summaries of its research and advisory reports, legal information, statistics of women’s employment and work conditions, summaries of other researches on women’s work, as well as a regional section, devoted to a more detailed description of women’s work situation in a particular region. Thus, the bulletin contributes to spreading the two types of expertise previously described: sociological expertise, by means of statistics and

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20 Comité du travail féminin, Meeting minutes, 8 November 1968, p.4.
21 Demanded by some women’s organizations, and seen by governmental actors as a way to adress the women’s issue, the creation of an information centre for women was discussed, at the time, by a small working group within the Department of Labor, of which Marcelle Devaud was part: CAC, 19860111, art.1, Letter of the State Secretary in charge of public relations to the Minister of Labor, 12 June 1970.
23 In 1974, the bulletin had a circulation of 2150. SDFE Archives, Note to Comittee members, August 1974.
results of research projects, and legal expertise, by means of summaries of the Committee’s advisory reports and as detailed legal information on current reforms. When a new law is passed, the Committee provides bulletin readers with precise, exemplified information on its provisions. For example, in terms of equal access to jobs, the Committee not only informs job applicants with information on the possible appeals, but also offers employers examples of non-discriminatory job announcements.

Finally, the three seminars organized by the Committee in 1974, 1976 and 1979 are quite revealing of its will to create an epistemic community on women’s work, in view of the specific publics that are targeted each time. In 1974, the first seminar organized by the Committee was a seminar on “Women’s work in France”, organized specifically for European journalists specialized in women’s labor issues. This confirms the essential European/transnational dimension of Committee’s activities. The second and major such event was a 1976 two-day conference on “Women, work and society”, that targeted members of the public administration. The Departments of Labor, Health, Education and Equipment took part in the conference, which gathered 300 people. Finally, the Committee organized another two-day conference in 1979, labelled “Information conference on women’s labor”. The conference was targeted at documentation and information professionals (researchers, archivists, librarians), and aimed at assessing the available data on women’s labor, as well as drawing these professionals’ attention on women’s labor issues.

Therefore, the target publics of the Committee’s seminar well reveal its ambition in building an epistemic community. While two of them target key relays of information (European journalists and documentation professionals), the other one, beyond the diffusion of information, is guided by a more direct political goal, since the Committee then addresses members of the public administration, who are directly in charge of reforms. This pertains to a broader scheme following which the Committee’s governmental status facilitates the production of policy-relevant knowledge.

25 CAC, 19860111, art. 11.
The production of policy-relevant knowledge

Following Haas’s definition, what distinguishes an epistemic community from any other network of knowledgeable people on a particular subject is its claim to “policy-relevant” knowledge within this particular issue-area\(^{26}\) (Haas 1992).

As described earlier, this is precisely the type of knowledge produced by the CTF, in the particular form of a “critical expertise”, whereby policy recommendations are, in a large part, inferred from a criticism of existing laws and policies – the latter criticism being, in turn, based upon foreign legal examples, supranational soft laws, the identification of social trends and denunciation of social inequalities. Admittedly, the Committee is not the only place where such policy-relevant knowledge is produced. However, the Committee’s particular situation at the interface of state and society was a unique asset in this perspective, enabling it to produce highly relevant critical expertise in terms of policy impact. While the previous section sheds light on the social preconditions that favored the definition of a critical stance (the most active Committee members being equal employment activists), the focus here will be on the Committee’s interface with the governmental agenda, which explains the “policy relevance” of the Committee’s expertise.

Because of its governmental status, the Committee has statutory and/or de facto easy access to key information regarding current reforms, that (non governmental) pressure groups usually struggle to reach. The most obvious example of such is draft bills in preparation, on which the CTF is systematically informed, and sometimes asked for advice by its head minister. Access to draft bills is a key resource since it enables the Committee to exert its influence on law in the early stages of its making, before draft bills are on the parliamentary agenda, thereby maximizing the chances of impact.

The Committee’s governmental status also provides it with easy access to higher public servants and professionals from the department of labor and other relevant departments or public organizations. The hearing of these people who play an important role in policy making and/or implementation is a common practice for the Committee: almost every plenary meeting implies a presentation by some such “outside” expert, and the Committee’s various commissions may also organize hearings. These enable Committee members and staff to get precise, up-to-date information on topics such as planned reforms or the functioning of

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\(^{26}\) “An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992: 3).
various governmental organizations that are set up or transformed at the time (for example, the unemployment bureau, or the organizations in charge of job training).

But as part of a ministry, the Committee also has more general access to governmental information, for example by means of governmental news bulletins. Beyond their use as information resources, devices such as hearings, submission of draft laws and the use of governmental news bulletin contribute to the Committee’s immersion in a governmental culture, which facilitates the phrasing of its recommendations in a language that immediately speaks to governmental officials.

For all these reasons, thanks to its standing at the interface of state and society, the Committee was a key actor in the translation of knowledge regarding women’s labor into policy recommendations, that is, “policy-relevant” knowledge.

Finally, it should be stressed that what has been presented here in terms of access to information in order to produce a policy-relevant expertise also represent more direct political assets in view of the Committee’s policy influence. For example, the CTF has all the more chances to influence its head minister since it is officially asked to give its advice on draft bills. However, this submission process is not automatic, and part of the more strictly political side of the work performed by Committee leaders consists in lobbying the minister of labor in order to get official submission. Similarly, the hearing of higher public servants and professionals from the department of labor and other public organizations not only functions as a way for the CTF to get information on ongoing policy implementation and reforms, but also provides the Committee with as many occasions to lobby policy actors and spread its equal employment message.

Conclusion

To conclude, I argue that the Committee could not have produced the expertise it produced, and have such (however limited) influence, had it not been invested by women’s rights advocates. But conversely, these advocates may not have had such influence without the Committee, which served as a catalyst of previously disparate mobilizations, and gave them a direct entry into the political process. Therefore, the Committee’s marginal situation at the interface of state and society, while previously described as its weakness, turns out as an asset in view of its influence on legal reforms and public policymaking.

The extent of this influence should, however, be qualified. Indeed, while it initiated some reforms, and notably the 1972 law on equal pay, the Committee could not prevent others that went against its equal employment perspective, such as laws that facilitated part-time work
and opened the possibility for long parental leaves. Moreover, equal employment laws had a very limited reach (Mazur 1995). For example, while the Committee promoted “equal pay for work of equal value”, and indeed obtained such provision in the 1972 equal pay law, this provision was never fully implemented. As early as 197627, the Committee complained about the insufficient implementation of this provision, and in fact, pay discrimination remained understood strictly in terms of direct discrimination. What could have been the legal basis for a pay equity policy remained without reach — a fact that can be linked to both the lack of a grassroots movement or union mobilization around this issue, as well as the absence of any administrative structure specifically in charge of implementing equal pay legislation. The Committee, with its very limited means of functioning, could not have played that role. This reveals the limit of its influence, having no control over the implementation of laws.

References


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The Comité du travail féminin is abolished, and a new Conseil supérieur de l’égalité professionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes is created.

Table 2

List of the main research reports, notes and advisory reports by the Comité du travail féminin between 1972 and 1975

- Research reports and notes

1972
Women’s vocational training
The state of women’s occupation and training in the regions

1973
Regional disparities in women’s occupation
Child care facilities
Women’s role in the economy (OECD command)
Women’s permanent vocational training

1974
Study of women’s labor force by economic sectors
Occupation or homemaking: women’s choices according to age
The situation of women’s occupation in March 1974
High rank women civil servants
Part-time work

1975
Women’s vocational training in rural areas
Regional disparities and perspectives in women’s occupation
The evolution of women’s status in society
Women’s permanent vocational training

1976
An assessment of the implementation of the December, 1972 law on equal pay between men and women
Issues related with women’s working conditions

- Advisory reports

1973
Advisory report on the decree regarding the 1972 law on equal pay between men and women
Advisory report on the draft bill on the improvement of working conditions (title 3)
Advisory report on governmental project regarding the crafts and retailing
Advisory report on the « social status of mothers” project by the family advisory committee

1975
Advisory report on mothers’ social pay
Advisory report on the draft bill on manual workers’ and mothers’ retirement
Advisory report on three draft bills (regarding the labour code, the family code and the status
of civil servants)