Contentious Institutions

Rethinking the Movement-State Intersection


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Social movement theory overwhelmingly relies on the assumption of an irreducible dichotomy between social movements and the state. Yet, the early view of social movements being totally deprived of institutional resources and systematically embracing a confrontational stance towards the state has been put into question in the last decades. Social movement theorists have accepted the idea of a possible institutionalization of protest. They have observed that many social movements born with an anti-institutional stance have moved towards a more accommodationist position: social movement actors have adopted more routinized means of action and have accepted the idea of cooperating with, rather than systematically opposing, the state (Costain & McFarland 1998; Giugni & Passy 1998; Meyer & Tarrow 1998, p.508; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001; Walker 2010). At the same time, and the two paths are of course closely linked, states have become more opened to social movements ideas and actors (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht 2003). In this new context, some social movement scholars have proposed to see social movements-state interaction as a “conflictual cooperation” (Giugni & Passy 1998), and others have asserted the idea of a “social movements society” (Meyer & Tarrow 1998), in which social movements protest is a full dimension of routinized politics.

However, this new theoretical view on the movement-state interactions in the context of an increasing institutionalization of social movements did not lead to a challenge of one of the most solid assumptions of social movement theory, what we can call the “great divide” between social movements and the state. While the dichotomy between protest and institutional politics has appeared more fuzzy, the ultimate criterion used to define social movements has remained their location outside the state. While it was no more, in many cases, their main enemy, the state has been persistently considered as social movements’ main target. Moreover, the integration of social movement ideas and actors by state institutions has remained overwhelmingly seen as a success of social movements, according to Gamson classical model (Gamson 1990), but also as a co-optation and de-radicalization process that equates with the end of protest politics.

Since the 1980s, scholarly works on women’s movements, feminism and the state have played a crucial role in challenging the dominant vision of the relationship between protest politics and mainstream institutions (Franzway, Court, & Connell 1989; Gelb 1989; Eisenstein 1990; Sawer 1990; Watson 1990; Stetson & Mazur 1995; Gelb & Palley 1996; Katzenstein 1998a; Revillard 2007; Goertz & Mazur 2008; Banaszak 2010; McBride, Mazur, & Lovenduski 2010). On the one hand, women’s movements have followed a path of institutionalization in the course the 1980s and 1990s, through a formalization, professionalization and routinization of their forms of action. On the other hand, states have responded to women’s movements protests by setting up positions and instances specifically devoted to the promotion of women’s rights at different levels of government, and by carrying out public policies that followed feminist demands (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht 2003). Such bodies, positions and policies have proliferated in a variety of national contexts through the 1980s and 1990s, in the North and in the South, with the strong
support of international organizations, most notably the United Nations (Stetson & Mazur 1995; Lépinard 2007). Feminist scholars have drawn on this empirical path to map out new theoretical views on the relationship between feminist protest and the state. The concept of state feminism has been asserted by feminist scholars as early as the 1980s to subsume the idea that feminist ideas and actors could possibly develop within mainstream institutions, primarily inside the state. Whether placing the focus on gender equality policies and ideas carried out by the state, on individual actors pursuing gender equality goals within the state (usually referred as “femocrats”), or on bureaucratic bodies formally devoted to the advancement of women’s status (women’s policy agencies), the concept of state feminism has been broadly associated with the idea of a possible presence of feminism within the state. In this respect, the literature on state feminism has contributed to blur the boundaries between civil society and the state, social movements and institutions, disruptive action and conventional politics.

In this paper, we draw on this rich literature on women’s movements, feminism and the state to propose a new definition of contentious politics that would not rest on the great divide between civil society and the state. In our view, most works on the interaction between women’s movements, feminism and the state have not drawn the full conclusions of their critique of the traditional model of contentious politics. With some notable exceptions (Katzenstein 1998b; Katzenstein 1998a; Banaszak 2005; Banaszak 2010), most of them rest more or less explicitly on the idea of a social movement-state dichotomy, and conceptualize the movement-state interaction in terms of alliance rather than in terms of intersection.

Drawing mostly on the works of Banaszak and Katzenstein, who fiercely challenge the common definition of social movements as being irreducibly located outside institutions, we make the case for fully recognizing the existence of an intersection between movements and dominant institutions, including the state. However, unlike Banaszak, we maintain that this intersection not only relies on individual actors who stem from the women’s movement and who work within the state. Our argument is that the institutions that are explicitly devoted to promoting women’s status within the state can be viewed, under certain circumstances, as contentious institutions (Revillard 2007). These institutions are not only the relays of outside “women’s movement” or “feminist” demands and actors into the state. We argue that they possess a contentious dimension as such, which can be activated in certain historical contexts. They can be active purveyors of feminist protest, in interaction with other women’s advocacy actors in other areas of the social space. We conclude that women’s policies agencies be considered as an integral part of a broader field of women’s advocacy (Bereni 2007), composed of a variety of actors in a multiplicity of social fields.

We begin with detailing how the rich literature on women’s movement, feminism in the state has contributed, over the past 25 years, to blur the boundary between protest and institutions. We also point out the limitations of those approaches with respect to our theoretical project to map out a new conceptualization of the women’s movement, across the civil society-state divide. In a second time, we make the case for considering women’s policy agencies as contentious institutions. We conclude that these institutions must be
considered as full part of a broader field of women’s advocacy, in interaction with other collective actors in different social fields.

1. WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS, FEMINISM, AND THE STATE: A BLURRING DIVIDE BETWEEN PROTEST AND INSTITUTIONS

In the course of the 1980s, as “autonomous” new women’s movements were declining and states were displaying increasing openness to women’s movements ideas and actors, a new vision of the relationship between women’s movements, feminism and the state started to proliferate in feminist thinking. Feminist scholars increasingly viewed the state as a possible arena for feminist action, against the dominant feminist viewpoint that feminism and bureaucracy were irreducible enemies (Ferguson 1984). This new vision was early conveyed by the term of “state feminism” (Hernes 1987), which gave birth to a great deal of research in the following decades, enriching and specifying in a more and more sophisticated way the meaning of an initially loose concept (Revillard 2006b; Mazur & McBride 2007).

The body of research commonly subsumed under the heading of state feminism is not a unified field. This scholarship has developed since the 1980s in a variety of national contexts and at different time periods, relating to distinct empirical cases. Additionally, this scholarship has proliferated in a diversity of disciplinary settings and research fields. The issue has been mostly addressed, on the one hand, by feminist sociologists specialized in women’s movements (e.g. (Katzenstein 1998a; Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht 2003; Banaszak 2010)), and, on the other hand, by feminist political scholars specialized in policy analysis (Mc Bride Stetson & Mazur 1995a; McBride, Mazur, & Lovenduski 2010). The diversity of theoretical viewpoints and empirical cases is one of the most valuable dimensions of this field of research. However, although feminist scholars specialized in the women’s movement-state interaction with different disciplinary backgrounds have tended to engage in a mutual dialog, one should emphasized that they have not been working with the same theoretical models, methodologies and research questions. One of the aims of this paper is to push further the cross-fertilization of these multiple conceptualizations in order to map out a new vision of feminist contention.

The abundant literature on women’s movement, feminism, and the state since the 1980s will not be extensively detailed and discussed here (for other literature reviews, see (Revillard 2006b; Mazur & McBride 2007; Mazur & McBride 2008; Stoffel 2009)). Rather, we focus on what we identified as four main ways to conceptualize state feminism and, thus, to challenge the classical divide between protest and institutions: firstly, the femocratic approach, which has associated state feminism with the presence of individual actors promoting gender equality within the bureaucracy; secondly, the RNGS approach, named after the body of research issued by the Research Network on Gender and the state since the late 1990s, and which focuses on women’s policy agencies as (potential) institutional relays of feminist women’s movements ideas and actors within the state; thirdly, the coalition approach, named after a series of works on alliances between women located in different arenas – inside and outside institutions (women’s autonomous organizations, state bureaucracy, political parties, academia, elected offices...) – around
gender equality issues; the intersectional approach, lastly, which refers to the works that have conceptualized the continuity of the women’s movement across institutional lines.

1.1. The femocratic approach: a focus on individual feminists

The introduction of the concept of “state feminism” is generally attributed to the Norwegian feminist scholar Helga Hernes (Hernes 1987). In the specific context of Scandinavian countries, marked by a highly corporatist model, and where the relationship between women’s movements and mainstream political institutions has traditionally been less confrontational than in many other national settings, she argued that the state could “empower” women. She asserted that the interplay between “state feminism” (or “feminism from above”) and grassroots women’s organizations (“feminization from below”) could lead to a more “woman-friendly” polity. However, in this early work, state feminism was loosely defined (Mazur & McBride 2007). It remained unclear whether state feminism was referring to a set of gender equality ideas and policies issued by the state, a network of women seeking to advance women’s interest within the state, or bureaucratic bodies specifically devoted to the promotion of women’s status.

At the same moment, a set of works by Australian feminist scholars brought a crucial contribution to state feminism theory (Franzway, Court, & Connell 1989; Eisenstein 1990; Sawer 1990; Watson 1990; Eisenstein 1995a; Eisenstein 1995b). These works gave birth to what we call the “femocratic” approach to state feminism, associating the feminist presence within the state with the action of individual advocates of women’s rights working within the bureaucracy, and who have been called “femocrats” (a contraction of feminist bureaucrats). Initially used only to refer to women working in positions specifically devoted to a women’s rights agenda, the label femocrat rapidly broadened to designate the whole set of feminist actors working within the state, whether or not located in women’s policy positions or structures.

Like in the Nordic case, such theoretical innovations were closely linked to the specific national context in which they developed (Sawer 1990). In Australia, actors from the women’s movement, some of them identifying as radical feminists, had entered into the state as early as the beginning of the 1970s, in the heydays of the new feminist movement. In 1972, the newly elected Labor Prime minister appointed Elisabeth Reid, a philosopher tied to a radical feminist organization, as his “advisor on women’s affairs”. Similar positions and new bodies devoted to women’s rights proliferated at all levels of government (from local to federal) and in a variety of policy sectors during the following decades. These feminist actors within the state, initially stemming from the women’s movement, advocated for gender equality policies, achieving a certain level of success.

This specific national context helps understand the development of a new theorizing of the state from a feminist perspective. Challenging the dominant feminist stance on the state most notably asserted by Ferguson (Ferguson 1984), several Australian scholars including Watson (Watson 1990), Eisenstein (Eisenstein 1995a), Sawer (Sawer 1990) and Franzway & al. (Franzway, Court, & Connell 1989) argued that the state was not, by definition, entirely patriarchal and hostile to women’s interests. They maintained that the state should not be considered as a monolithic power, but needed rather to be seen as an heterogeneous body, comprised of conflicting interests, ideologies and bodies, and notably divided into a
multiplicity of government levels and policy sectors. These theorists argued that individual feminists, whom they called femocrats, were able to take advantage of this heterogeneous setting to promote a feminist agenda.

Focusing on individual actors provided a fruitful way to theorize the continuity between the women’s movement and the state. Several scholars associated with the femocratic approach have used the notion of accountability to grasp the multiple (conflicting) identities of individual feminists working inside the state (Eisenstein 1995b; Katzenstein 1998a; Banaszak 2010). Indeed, as Eisenstein (herself a former Australian femocrat) asks, “What is to guarantee that once they rise to positions of influence and power, women will remain true to the interests of the mass of women?” Working within the state institutions imposes a set of constraints. Femocrats, be they feminist activists, can’t ignore the dominant bureaucratic norms and values if they want to achieve their goals and maintain their position within the state. In other words, femocrats are in the first place accountable to government and bureaucracy. But at the same time, as Eisenstein argues, femocrats have proved to be accountable to the women’s movement as well, although there was no formal, legal basis for such an accountability. Most of the early femocrats came from the women’s movement and individually maintained their links to the movement over time. They remained loyal to feminist demands coming from the women’s movement. “In the Australian context, there has been a strong notion that the femocrats are in some sense accountable to the women’s movement. Placed in power by the strength of women’s activism, they are widely seen to be the arm of the women’s movement in government.” (Eisenstein 1995b, p.72-73). This double accountability to the women’s movement and to the government doesn’t work without tensions. As Eisenstein points out, Australian femocrats have recurrently been suspected by women’s movement actors to place bureaucratic interest ahead of women’s concerns.

In the course of the 1990s and 2000s, the femocratic approach to state feminism has been fruitfully applied to other national cases and enriched with new conceptual insights. Among others, Outshoorn (Outshoorn 1994) used the term femocrat to refer to those individual actors working in official women’s policy agencies. Her vision combined the individual concept of femocrat with the institutional concept of women’s policy agency, a new approach to state feminism that was concomitantly developed by a group feminist scholars of the state and public policies (Mazur 1995; Stetson & Mazur 1995). Additionally, she put the emphasis on the relationship of femocrats to feminist ideas and actors. She divided the femocrats into two categories: the professionals, who are “career-oriented” and primarily devoted to the bureaucratic norms and values, and the “allies”, who are “movement-oriented”, embracing some of the women’s movement ideas and concerns.

Katzenstein’s work on feminist protest inside the Church and the Military, although not referring to the term “femocrat” (which is closely associated with feminist bureaucrats) can be associated, to some extent, with the femocratic approach, although it is combined with an organizational perspective, as we will see further in the paper. Indeed, Katzenstein uses a qualitative, micro-sociological approach to feminist protest within institutions, and makes

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1 For further conceptualizations of the state as an heterogeneous entity, encompassing a wide array of conflicting interests and ideas, and possibly including feminist perspectives, also see (Gelb & Palley 1996; Waylen 1998; Gelb & Hart 1999)
a central use of the notion of accountability to understand the multiple, conflicting allegiances of feminist protesters struggling within institutions (Katzenstein 1998a).

More recently, the work of Banaszak on “feminist activists inside the state”, or “feminist insiders” in the American context draws on the femocratic approach to state feminism (Banaszak 2005; Banaszak 2010). Banaszak also focuses qualitatively on feminist individuals within the state, rather than on women’s policy agencies. However, as we will see further in greater details, she differs from most works on femocrats by conceptualizing the network of feminist bureaucrats as making up the “movement-state intersection”. She deliberately rejects the term femocrat, for it tends to reassert, in her view, a misleading dichotomy between women’s movement activists working inside and outside the state.

1.2. The RNGS approach: a Focus on Women’s Policy Agencies

By the mid-1990s, a new approach to state feminism began to develop in feminist theory, shifting the focus from individual actors (femocrats) to institutional bodies (women’s policy agencies). This new perspective was introduced by Dorothy Stetson McBride and Amy Mazur’s landmark book on Comparative state feminism (McBride Stetson & Mazur 1995b), and further developed conceptually and empirically by the Research Network on Gender and the state (RNGS) (McBride, Mazur, & Lovenduski 2010). Political scientists, rather than sociologists, were the driving force of this new theoretical approach to state feminism. The central research question was no longer the transformations of social movements and contentious politics. Rather, the main issue addressed by this new series of works on state feminism was whether or not public policies could integrate feminist perspectives, and to what extent women’s policy bodies were instrumental to this process.

The core analytical unit of this new perspective on state feminism is the notion of women’s policy agency (WPA). As Mazur and McBride write, “The RNGS research design proposed to study state feminism by comparing the effectiveness of women’s policy agencies in advancing women’s movement goals in the policymaking processes of postindustrial democracies (RNGS 2006)” (Mazur & McBride 2007, p.507). Firstly, RNGS researchers sought to establish whether feminist movement goals and actors were included by women’s policy agencies. Secondly, they sought to assess to what extent WPAs’ presence and action within the state could account for bringing feminist movements’ demands (substantive representation) and actors (descriptive representation) into the broader policymaking process. In other words, in the RNGS perspective, “state feminism only occurs when the women’s policy agency is bringing feminist actors and ideas into the state. Achieving state feminism, therefore, is more than the representation of women’s interests or even demands of women’s movement groups; it is the representation of feminist interests and actors making feminist claims to produce feminist outcomes.” (Mazur & McBride 2007, p.508). This research design, which was carried out by more than 40 scholars in a range of 13 countries and 5 gender policy issues (abortion, job training, political representation, prostitution, and the priority or “hot” issues), led to a four-term typology of state feminism: “Insider where agencies’ goals reflect movement goals and the agency genders the issue frame of the debate; Marginal agencies that promote movement goals but are not able to change the issue frame; Nonfeminist category where the agency genders the debate but with ideas and goals that do not reflect women’s movement ideas;
and Symbolic where the agency takes no position and does not gender the debate”. In the end, the RNGS comparative study has provided the empirical evidence that “state agencies for gender equality and advancing the status of women have, since the 1970s, increased both substantive and descriptive representation of women across a variety of issues in 13 postindustrial democracies.” (Mazur & McBride 2007)

In this theoretical perspective, interestingly (and, from a social movement view, paradoxically enough), women’s policy agencies are at the center of the attention, but they are not studied for themselves (Revillard 2006b). The focus is placed on the extent to which they will reflect feminist movement demands and achieve their integration into public policy. In other words, they are studied as the “intervening variable” between feminist women’s movements and the policy-making process. As we mentioned above, the concern of the RNGS theorists is to address WPAs as a means by which feminist perspectives are brought into the state. Their aim is not to study them as (new forms of) contentious actors. Moreover, rather than leading to the idea of a continuity, RNGS scholars draw a strong line between WPAs and the women’s movement. Indeed, central to RNGS's research design is whether WPAs respond to feminist demands stemming from the women’s movement. In this perspective, the duality between WMA and WPAs is, by definition, strictly reasserted (Mazur & McBride 2007). Although WPAs can be feminist, i.e. embracing a feminist discourse, they are not, by definition, part of the feminist women’s movement. WPAs can only be the allies of women’s movement actors, and the relays of their ideas within the state. Behind this strong distinction lies the idea that feminist contention originally and primarily comes from the “autonomous” women’s movement, comprised of civic associations located outside the state (and, presumably, outside of other mainstream institutions such as the academia and political parties).

Social movement scholars have insufficiently considered the insights of RNGS research work, and have more broadly overlooked the contribution of the whole body of political science research on feminism and the state in their recent effort to re-conceptualize contentious politics. Yet, from a contentious politics perspective, the research produced within the RNGS research framework is an extremely valuable tool. It brought a huge theoretical and empirical validation of the idea that contentious feminist action can proliferate within the state, and by extension, within other mainstream institutions. However, we argue that the strict boundary drawn by RNGS between WPAs and women’s movement’s actors (WMAs) should be put into questions, if we aim at drawing the full conclusions of this study from a social movement perspective. It seems to us that the continuity, rather than the rupture, should be emphasized between WMAs and WPAs. The contentious dimension of WPAs must be sociologically analyzed for itself. WPAs, as we will argue in further details in the next section, can be considered as contentious institutions that are fully part of a broader field of women’s advocacy crossing a variety of social fields.

1.3. The coalition approach: cross-sectional alliances of women advocates

Along with the works focusing on feminist individuals and institutions within the state bureaucracy, the literature on feminist policy coalitions has drawn the attention to the blurring boundary between social movements and mainstream institutions with respect to feminist contention (Mazur 2002; Stoffel 2005; Holli 2008).
As showed by Holli, several concepts have been coined in feminist theory to refer to “women’s co-operation constellations”, which she defines broadly as “any kind of actual co-operation initiated or accomplished by one or several groups of women in a policy process to further their aims or achieve goals perceived as important to them” (Holli 2008, p.169). Among these conceptualizations, the metaphor of the “triangle” has been particularly successful, to a large extent because it refers to the concept of “iron triangle”, which has been a landmark of policy analysis since the 1960s. An early conceptualization of a feminist triangle was Haalsa’s “strategic partnership”, mapped out in the beginning of the 1990s in the Norwegian case (Haalsa 1991; Haalsa 1998). Haalsa argued that women’s achievements in Norwegian public policies could be partly accounted for by the emergence of alliances between women politicians, women bureaucrats and women activists from women’s organizations on “pragmatic, specific issues” (Haalsa 1991, cited by (Holli 2008, p.171)). In the Norwegian context, Haalsa stated, this kind of strategic partnership worked as a “triangle of empowerment” for women. Haalsa’s conceptualizations have been subsequently used and re-worked by other feminist political scholars, such as Vargas and Wieringa (Vargas & Wieringa 1998), Amy Mazur (Mazur 2002), and Alison Woodward (Woodward 2003). In these conceptualizations, the nature of the participants of the triangle slightly varies. For Mazur, only femocrats working in WPAs are part of the “state” corner of the triangle, whereas Haalsa’s refers to the broad category of “women bureaucrats”; for Vargas and Wieringa, the state corner of the triangle is made up of feminist bureaucrats working within the state, not specifically in WPAs. Addressing the network of women advocates at the European institutions level, Alison Woodward more substantially redefines the corners of the triangle: her “velvet triangles” are made up with women coming from “the organizations of the state, of civil society and universities and consultancies”. In this definition, party women, public office women and women bureaucrats are conflated in the same corner of the triangle, and academics/experts on women and gender appear as a new category of strategic participants.

As in the RNGS approach, most of the coalition approach concepts have been driven by a policy analysis framework rather than by social movement theory. First, there is generally little sociological input on how these coalitions emerge, who (what women) get involved in them, and why they last (or don’t last). These coalitions are often less analyzed for themselves than for their impact on policy-making. Second, the women’s movement’s definition remains unchanged. It is still limited to a set of organizations located “outside” dominant institutions (the state, political parties, the academia...). We maintain that the literature on feminist advocacy coalitions provides substantial theoretical and empirical insight to call into question the traditional definition of contentious politics. From a social movement perspective, these concepts allow to rethink women’s advocacy activities across the boundaries that are traditionally drawn between the state, the polity, and civil society (Revillard 2006a; Bereni 2007; Bereni 2009).

1.4. The intersectional approach: theorizing the overlap between contentious politics and institutions

The last approach to women’s movement, feminism and the state that is identified here is what we call the intersectional approach, echoing Banaszak’s concept of “movement-state intersection”. Along with Banaszak’s recent study on “movement insiders” in the American
bureaucracy (Banaszak 2005; Banaszak 2010), we include in this category Katzenstein’s work on feminist “unobtrusive mobilization” within the American Catholic Church and the Military (Katzenstein 1990; Katzenstein 1998b; Katzenstein 1998a). Those two contributions are of particular interest for us because, in a social movement perspective, they explicitly challenge the divide between social movements and institutions, which remains untouched in many policy analysis works on state feminism.

In her study of women’s claims making within the Church and the Military, Katzenstein argued that feminist protest moved from the streets to mainstream institutions after its heydays in the 1960s and 1970s. Women’s groups have formed and feminist claims have been made within institutions that are as male-dominated as the Catholic Church and the Military. Women’s advocates in these institutions have struggled to promote women’s interests and voices. While feminists within the military took a “moderate” stance, focusing on bringing the legal equal opportunity framework into their institution, feminists within the Catholic Church engaged in a more “radical” discursive politics.

As Katzenstein points out, social movement scholars have usually overlooked the contentious dimension of social movement voices incorporated within institutional settings. As she puts it, “Institutional actors (lawyers, judges, politicians, employers, journalists) are definitionally precluded from being social movement activists – except after hours” (Katzenstein 1998b, p.195).

In her view, this is to be party explained by the “unobtrusive” character of feminist protest within institutions. However, more structurally, this common view comes from a (false) theoretical schema that pervades most studies of social movements. As she writes, “This presumed inconsistency between movement politics and institutional politics is based on a frequently drawn linkage of location, form, and content. When social movement actors doing street politics (location) opt for or ally themselves with those who use conventional modes (forms) of political activism such as lobbying or voting, a social movement is generally deemed to have crossed the threshold separating protest politics from institutional politics, and the result is presumed to be de-radicalizing (content)” (Katzenstein 1998b, p.195-196).

Katzenstein’s critique of the mechanical conflation between three different dimensions of protest action (location, form, and content) in social movement theory is a crucial tool to rethink contentious politics. The distinction between “contentious” and “normal” politics can no longer only rely first and foremost on the location of action. Institutionalized movements can pursue contentious goals, possibly radical.

As pointed out above, the value of Katzenstein’s approach is to combine individual and organizational dimensions to study protest within institutions. Not only does she reflect, in the same way as the first theorists of “femocracy”, about the multiplicity of accountabilities of social movement actors within dominant institutions (she distinguishes between three levels of accountability: discursive, financial, and organizational). Another key concept in Katzenstein’s theorizing is the notion of “organizational habitat”. Whereas the femocratic approach is focused on how individual actors from the movement bring protest into institutions, Katzenstein proposes to think institutional settings as organizational environments that potentially favor protest. In her study, “The institutionalization of feminist activism [...] refers to the establishment of organizational habitats of feminists.
within institutional environments. Such habitats are spaces where women advocates of equality can assemble, where discussion can occur, and where the organizing for institutional change can originate.” (Katzenstein 1998b, p.197). We believe that this concept of “organizational habitat” is extremely useful to examine to what extent women's policy agencies, as institutions, might provide a space favorable to the development and maintenance of feminist protest within the state.

Banaszak's work on feminist protest inside and outside the state is also extremely useful to think feminist protest within the state as a full part of the women's movement. She studies the mobilizing of American feminist bureaucrats inside the state over the past 50 years and their relationships with other components of the women's movement outside the state. She argues that while feminist activists within the state have often worked discretely, “under the radar” (echoing Katzenstein's description of feminists’ “unobtrusive mobilization” within institutions), they have had a central role in the emergence, the forms and the successes of the American new women's movement since the 1960s. A small group of feminist bureaucrats in the 1960s used their informational, material, and network resources as state insiders to foster the first organizations of the “new” women's movement outside the state. In the following decades, they continuously mobilized the resources attached to their insider's position in order to advance women's movement goals, and did so even when women's movement’s activities outside the state were declining and when the political environment was explicitly hostile to feminist ideas (e.g., during the Reagan years). Drawing on Katzenstein's framework, Banaszak argues that this continuous feminist contentious action within the state has been overlooked because of the tenacious superposition between location, tactics and goals in social movement theory.

Banaszak's approach pertains, to some extent, to the femocratic approach, since she focuses on individuals rather than on institutions. She sees the network of feminist activists within the federal bureaucracy at large (not only in WPAs) as full women's movement actors. However, unlike other conceptualizations of femocrats (most notably (Outshoorn 1994)), she argues that bureaucrats pursuing feminist goals in any subdivision of the state (not only in women's “policy-ghettos”) are full part of the women's movement. The network of feminist activists working inside the state makes up what she calls the “movement-state intersection”. We find Banaszak conceptualization extremely valuable to think the women's movement-state continuity. She fruitfully draws on state feminism scholarship to radically call into question the dominant social movement paradigms of an irreducible border between social movements and the mainstream institutions. However, we argue that her approach centered on individual actors should be complemented with a focus on how certain institutional settings contribute to produce feminist contention within dominant institutions.
2. BRINGING INSTITUTIONS BACK IN

2.1. Analyzing movement-state intersection: from individuals to institutions

According to Banaszak, by focusing on institutions, state feminism research has tended to reinforce the state-movement frontier, when in the meantime this dichotomy has been increasingly challenged by women's movement scholarship. In her view, taking individuals, as opposed to institutions, as the departing point for research is the only way to account for the actual continuity between social movement activism and bureaucratic action. This focus on individuals indeed enables her to locate feminism where it usually goes unnoticed, in places such as mainstream governmental departments. While the unveiling of feminist activism within these institutional locations represents a decisive input to the understanding of feminist contentious politics, a contribution which indeed is only made possible by the choice to focus on individuals rather than institutions, something also gets lost in this choice of research framing. The analysis of state-movement interactions cannot solely rely on a study of individual activism, but must also take into account the role of institutions – more precisely, in our case, institutions in charge of women's policy. Banaszak's warning regarding the risk of reinforcing the state-movement dichotomy by focusing on institutions must, however, be taken seriously. Indeed, while the continuity between movement and state, activism and occupation, may be more easily grasped as the two dimensions intricate within one's biography and representations, it is much less obvious when one looks at institutions that are clearly labeled as state actors. The idea here is not to negate the existence of a distinction between state and non-state. To be sure, one's position within or without the state matters; each location induces particular constraints and resources: civil society actors may demonstrate, whereas a women's bureau won't; the latter's head may take part in a council of minister, whereas the former cannot. While taking these different locations and their effects into account, our idea, inspired by the literature reviewed in the previous section, is to avoid the conflation of location, tactics and goals, which tends to prevent one from acknowledging the very possibility of contention within the state. As Banaszak's works have shown, the state may be a site for individual feminist contention. Our aim is to take this analysis a step further, by showing the role of women's policy institutions as contentious collective actors within the state.

How can we account for the role of institutional dynamics in feminist contention without reinforcing the state-movement dichotomy? The idea is to take a fresh look at these women's policy institutions without making any a priori assumption about the implications of their governmental/state status. Being part of the state implies particular constraints and resources for action, which must be described, but it doesn't automatically induce a particular position towards the movement, such as “de-radicalizing”, “co-opting” or “relay”. This, if it is the case, can only be inferred from a careful ethnography of the institution. This undetermined nature of WPAs is a great insight of the RNGS project, as shown in the previous section with its typology regarding the possible orientations of WPAs. Here again, our idea is to take this result a step further as far as its consequences in terms of contentious politics are concerned. The variations in WPAs orientation (across time, policy domains and countries) are well documented by the RNGS project, but the broader implications of this statement in terms of the analysis of contentious politics are not fully explored – a fact, which, according to us, derives from two other important choices made in
the RNGS research frame. First, as stressed in the previous section, the RNGS’s definition of the women’s movement implies a by principle exclusion of state institutions from the range of women’s movement actors. This, due to the common conflation between location (state/movement) and goals or content (policymaking/contention), tends to preclude these researchers from an acknowledgement of the possible contentious role of WPAs. Second, and paradoxically for a research project which puts WPAs at its core, WPAs as institutions are not the subject of a very detailed investigation. This is due the choice of research framing: since the focus of the RNGS project is on WPAs’ impact on policymaking in various sectors, these institutions must be seized within a broader policy environment. Since women’s movement orientations must be taken into account as well, this broad focus necessarily entails a rather macro perspective, which cannot be easily combined with a detailed ethnography of the institution in the same research project. This scale of research also levels an issue in view of an analysis of contentious politics within the state. Indeed, to get back to Banaszak’s research frame, what enables her to seize the mingling of state and movement dynamics is a careful sociological investigation of individual experiences. More generally speaking, working on a micro, very descriptive level, often is useful leverage against broad conceptual dichotomies (Callon & Latour 2006). Our idea is that, just as Banaszak’s reliance on a sociology of individual experience, a sociology of institutions may enable us to seize the mingling of bureaucratic and contentious dynamics.

What does this sociology of institutions imply, as far as state feminist institutions are concerned? As Katzenstein reminds us, speaking of institutions rather than simply organizations means focusing on the normative dimension of the organization at stake, the norms and beliefs that are associated to it (Katzenstein 1998a, p.33). Therefore, both organizational and cognitive dimensions must be explored in a sociology of state feminist institutions. To these two consolidated dimensions of institutions, we suggest to add a third, in order to bridge the organizational (objective) and cognitive dimensions of institutions; this dimension could be labeled routines, patterns or repertoires of action, and aims at answering to the question : what do these institutions (the people within them, and these institutions as collective actors) typically do? What are the common tasks accomplished by these institutional actors? Here again, working first at a very descriptive level will then enable us, in a second stage, to characterize these patterns of action, when combined to the cultural dimension of institutional action, as pertaining – or not – to contentious dynamics.

2.2. Organization

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the organizational basis of state feminist institutions, compared to the attention women’s movements have paid to this issue, notably by means of collective action in times when the organizational basis of women’s

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2 The very label of “Women’s policy agencies” tends to define them as “policy” actors, precluding an acknowledgement of their potentially contentious role; when in fact, as will be further developed below, they rarely are policy actors in their own right, and may uphold a contentious stand.

3 Sandrine Dauphin’s analysis of the Service des droits des femmes in France is a notable exception. (Dauphin 2002; Dauphin 2006; Dauphin 2010).
state institutions was perceived as threatened in one way or another\textsuperscript{4}. The organizational basis of state feminist institutions usually has a legal basis, which must be distinguished from the legal provisions creating and governing the institution in itself\textsuperscript{5}. Indeed, quite often, a governmental/parliamentary function or title in charge of women is first created, and quite some time may pass before a legal provision (often a by-law or decree rather than a law) defines the organization of its administrative service; this often ratifies a pre-existing organization, while consolidating it. The genesis of this organization illustrates the blurry frontier between cabinet and administrative service: the eventual administration often derives from the extension of a minister's cabinet. For example in France, the first ministerial function devoted to women was Françoise Giroud's appointment as state secretary in charge of women's condition (Secrétaire d'État à la condition féminine) in 1974. Until Yvette Roudy's appointment as Minister for women's rights in 1981, the ministerial function devoted to women was only supported by a cabinet; it did not have an administration of its own at its disposal. In the beginning of the 1980s, as Roudy's cabinet grew larger, a real administrative service started to form, and there was a gradual shift from cabinet to administration, as recalled by the minister herself when evoking the process that finally lead to the adoption of a 1984 by-law governing the Service des droits des femmes:

\begin{quote}
Q: I noticed that a by-law was passed in 1984, structuring the service: did this more or less legalize the pre-existing organization, or did it have a particular effect?

A: An audit was organized, a structure was put up. I didn’t mind, I went on as usual. Simply, my collaborators now had titles, appeared on an organization chart, which was no bad. They also could get civil servant status, which was not bad either\textsuperscript{6}.
\end{quote}

Just as any organization, a state feminist organization gathers material resources (in the form of offices, office equipments and supplies, financial resources, documentation – books, scientific journals, magazines, press reviews, reports by governmental institutions or NGOs – often compiled within a documentation centre of variable size) as well as people, who may be civil servants (who often were previously appointed in other ministerial departments) or hired on a contractual basis (a method of recruitment which may favor the hiring of people with a former activist profile). When one describes these organizational resources in such neutral terms, and if ones takes aside the governmental character of the organization, there appears to be proximity between these resources and common mobilization resources of social movements – at least for the most professionalized among

\textsuperscript{4} Evidence of this phenomenon can be found in the current feminist hostility, in France, regarding the possibility of linking the bureaus respectively in charge of women's rights and antidiscrimination policy. Similar reluctance was expressed in Quebec facing the prospect of transforming the «women's condition» (condition féminine) institutions into «equality» institutions, which would include men, as administrative agents as well as subjects of policymaking.

\textsuperscript{5} This is the first criterion defining WPAs in the RNGS project (citer).

\textsuperscript{6} Yvette Roudy, interview with Anne Revillard on 28 September 2005.
the latter, and/or those using the most conventional lobbying tactics\(^7\): offices and expertise in the form of documentation and brains to work on it are a prerequisite for lobbying both inside and outside the state. But in order to legitimately draw this parallel between state feminist institution and some forms of social movement masculinities, one must examine the type of ideas that are endorsed by these institutions and to what extent they relate to a broader feminist contentious frame, as well as the logics of action they follow.

2.3. Culture

Bearing in mind the definition of institutions as organizations infused with values, how can we account for this normative dimension of state feminist institutions? As reflected, on a material level, by the importance of paper in state feminist offices (in the form of books, reports, etc.), the latter are big readers and producers of discourse. Hence this cultural dimension appears quite fundamental for these institutions. How can we further characterize this discourse, in terms of content and form? What is this discourse about? Characterized in very broad terms, this discourse boils down to a definition of women’s issue, implicitly aiming at answering the following questions: what is at stake in the status of women, and how can it be improved? Here again, a very descriptive look at this discourse shows possible similarities between the latter and discourse that would be endorsed by a social movement. Take, for example, the following quote:

“This policy project questions the role imposed on women, it protests against the socialization process that entices them to conform to this role and denounces the ideology developed to justify stereotypes\(^8\).”

This sociologically informed feminist discourse (denouncing the social construction of gender), which may seem typical of the 1970s activism of some radical feminist groups, is in fact the introduction of an important 1978 governmental report that formally guided Quebec’s women’s policy for the following decades. In any other context, this discourse would qualify as a contentious stance. Why should its contentious dimension be denied solely on the basis of the governmental status of the enunciator? Here, we are indeed facing contentious discourse, a discourse that pertains to the broader field of contentious politics. In other contexts however, the Council of women’s status, author of this report, has upheld less openly activist stances. This quote obviously does not suffice to characterize the Council as a whole as a contentious actor, but it shows that in some instances – and in this particular case of the Quebec Conseil du statut de la femme, these are very common – the institution acts as a contentious actor.

While the content of feminist discourse so far has mainly been described in terms of level of contention, it can also be characterized in terms of agenda: what issues are defined as being at the core of the women’s issue at a given time and space? Here again, state feminist discourse may be fruitfully compared with the discourse endorsed by civil society

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7 Following Burstein (Burstein 1998), we argue in favor of a common apprehension of groups such as interest groups and social movement which are usually studied on a separate basis by political science and sociology.

feminist organizations. This comparison, however, should depart from an evaluation of the efficiency of state feminism as a relay of feminist discourse as defined outside of the state. Indeed, since the latter is not the only determinant of the agenda of state feminist institutions, these may also play a leading role in putting new feminist issues on the governmental agenda. Similarly, they may choose to focus on an issue that is not necessarily prominent among civil society organization. Such was the case in France in the 1970s, when the governmental institutions (such as the *Comité du travail féminin* or the *Secrétariat d'Etat à la condition féminine*) focused on employment issues, and to a lesser extent, timidly tackled the issue of political representation (Bereni & Revillard 2007) whereas civil society feminist organizations mainly addressed abortion and contraception issues.

Beyond its content, the form of discourse endorsed by state feminist institutions tends to confirm their contentious role within the state. Indeed, as will be illustrated below, a large part of the discourse they produce, be it in the form of critical expertise or policy statements, questions the policies implemented by other administrative actors, potentially putting them in conflict with the latter.

To finish this overview of the cognitive dimension of state feminist institutions, it should be stressed that even though one may infer from the mass of discourse produced by WPAs broad national “referentials” (Jobert & Muller 1987; Muller 2000) defining the women’s issue (Revillard 2009b), the diversity of the discourse produced by WPAs should be strongly stressed. As the RNGS project has well demonstrated, WPAs’ orientation must be characterized within particular policy environments and time frames. Furthermore, the institutions’ public discourse is not enough to fully grasp the institution’s culture. Indeed, the latter should be analyzed on many levels: notably, the beliefs endorsed by the staff (on an individual level, but also as reflecting the informal political culture of the organization) are not necessarily reflected literally in the administration’s reports, which must comply with other constraints (such as being credible in the eyes of higher civil servants in other ministerial departments, not only because the institution is a state institution, but also in a goal of efficiency).

Moreover, the organizational and cognitive dimensions of WPAs should be analyzed in relation with one another. Patterns of mutual reinforcement may indeed be identified: for example, in France, the formal organization (by means of a 1984 by-law) of the *Service des droits des femmes* in two main distinct services, equal employment and personal rights, both resulted from the way the women’s issue had started being framed within the service, and had a long-lasting effect on this framing. The incarnation of this particular definition of the women’s issue within two administrative bureaus, with their staff, their particular expertise objectified in reports and intern documentation, their allotted resources, all permitted the maintenance of this particular framing of the women’s issue, throughout governmental shifts from left to right. More crucially, the existence of an administration clearly is what permitted the survival of state feminist institutions in times of political backlash: on several instances when a new head of government would not care to appoint a minister or secretary of state in charge of women, it was pressed to do so by collective action both on the part of the administration’s personnel and on the part of outside feminist organizations, insisting on the fact that the women’s administration, which existed and could not easily be
suppressed, needed a head. Enabling a continuity in women’s advocacy within the state, the organizational basis of state feminism functions as a form of *abeyance structure* (Taylor 1989; Staggenborg 1996). Furthermore, the cultural/cognitive dimension of state feminism does not exist short of being incarnated in the administrative agents that sustain this definition of women’s issue. Hence the organization is what enables this culture to stay alive and be passed on. More specifically, whereas cabinet members are usually recruited on the basis of their pre-existing expertise on women’s issues, administrative agents may be recruited on totally different grounds. They may be civil servants coming from other administrations, who, when interviewed, will admit to a pre-existing sensibility for women’s issues, but who in fact may not necessarily have had any feminist background. For example, they may have arrived in state feminist institutions simply because they wanted to move away from their former administration, and not because they were particularly attracted by the topic. This case is particularly interesting because it reveals how, in such instances, the institution may function as a socializing entity, providing both professional and political identities. After being socialized within these institutions, some women will typically uphold a feminist discourse they previously did not endorse, or at least had no interest in. Their professional socialization is simultaneously, to some extent, a political socialization, fomenting some form of gender consciousness. The mingling of these two aspects is particularly striking for those for whom this appointment in state feminist institutions is the first administrative appointment.

### 2.4. Patterns of action

Here, the mingling of professional and political socializations shows how common administrative tasks (such as writing a report or speaking in a cross-ministerial meeting) may take on a contentious meaning. This calls for an analysis of a third aspect of state feminist institutions, i.e. its typical patterns of action: what do state feminist institutions do? To be sure, the activities conducted within state feminist institutions depend on the way their mission is defined. For example, some of them are endowed with a mission of handling individual complaints, such as the EEOC in the US (Pedriana & Stryker 2004), whereas others are not (for example, the *Service des droits des femmes* in France). Some of them are specialized in a mission of study or survey of gender inequalities, such as the *Observatoire de la Parité* in France. But most of the time, they are expected to endorse some form of policymaking role. At the level of discourse, this translates into broad women’s policy statements, which are adopted on a regular basis by these institutions. But when one takes a closer looks at the corresponding actions, this policymaking role is in fact quite hard to characterize for several reasons. First, these institutions, which are generally weak institutions within the state apparatus (Mazur 1995; Malloy 2003; Pedriana & Stryker 2004; Revillard 2009a), have little policy implementation power, if any, since they rely on a very scarce budget. Therefore, policy implementation often relies on civil society organizations (by means of funding granted to those among them which provide services within the frame of women’s policy), or takes the form of information campaigns. Second,

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9 Such was the case, for example, when the Right came back to power in 1986 (Revillard 2007, p.199-201).

10 This also holds true for the ministers themselves, as well as higher civil servants: Hélène Gisserot and Brigitte Grésy are cases in point.
state feminist institutions are also confronted with the fact that policies affecting women’s lives are defined by a broad spectrum of actors beyond themselves. As public policy analysis from a gender perspective has abundantly shown (Mazur 2002), virtually all policies have differential effects on men and women, and should be taken into account in view of a promotion of equality. This reality, theorized by “gender mainstreaming” theories and practices since the mid-1990s, had already been acknowledged much earlier by state feminist actors. The combination of this characteristic of policies affecting women and the weakness of these institutions results in a particular form of action, which consists in trying to convince other ministerial departments to change their policymaking in a more gender-conscious way. This mode of action induces conflict and often an open confrontation with other departments. For example, as Michèle André, state secretary for women’s rights from 1988 to 1991 recalls in a 2005 interview:

“I spent my time trying to convince my colleagues of the use of doing and paying for what I wanted them to do. Because I didn't have much money. I had [a small budget of intervention], and the rest, I had to win it and have others do it. For example, when I wanted to launch a campaign in favor of girl's vocational guidance, I had to go and convince [the minister in charge of Education] to pay for it. So I had to go and talk to them, and talk again up until they finally said: “Michèle, this makes sense, you are right”. It is awful! I mean, no, not awful, but it requires a lot of conviction and a lot of modesty”\(^\text{11}\).

Abundant evidence of this phenomenon can also be found at the level of common administrative agents, and not only among ministers, whose role is, in a sense, expected to be more political. The contentious stance some of these agents endorse will commonly lead to the perception of WPAs by other administrative agents as being part of civil society, and not part of the state, as this testimony of a former agent of the French SDFE illustrates:

“In meetings with representatives of the administration in various domains, they would sometimes address me saying: “you, your association”, when we represent the state. In the beginning, I thought it was because I initially had activist training, and that reflected in some way in my appearance, and that was why people were addressing me saying “your association”. But in fact, I realized that it was systematic, even with other [SDFE] agents, as soon as we showed some determination in the way we talked” (F25).

Now this logic of action, implying a critique and direct confrontation with other ministerial departments, differs from policymaking as it is commonly defined, and induces patterns of action that appear quite similar to those adopted by social movements, at least those which adopt the most reformist lobbying tactics: for example, writing a report based on expertise to demonstrate the gender-bias of one policy or another, or organizing a press conference to express criticism against existing policies. Moreover, other means of action which are more typical of the social worlds of government and parliament can be analyzed, in this case, as taking on a contentious dimension: taking part in inter-ministerial committees in order to try to convince the heads of other departments to change their policy orientation; informal discussions between ministers, leading to arguments and/or

\(^{11}\) Michèle André, interview with Anne Revillard, 20 January 2005.
negotiation; expressing a stance in front of the national assembly or the council of ministers.

Therefore, while some of the means of action deployed by state feminist institutions are common with those used by social movements, they also follow specific logics of action. Hence, and given the potentially contentious nature of these actions, one may use the notion of repertoire of contention, as defined by Tilly (Tilly 1984; Tilly 1986), to account for the particular lay-out of the means of actions used by state feminist institutions given the particular constraints they face, but also the resources they benefit from, as state actors. While the use of this concept stresses the proximity between the logics of action deployed by social movements and some public administrations, it also facilitates an understanding of how these institutions’ belonging to the state implies the use of specific means of action. Tilly’s concept of repertoire of contention is particularly heuristic here because it prevents one from thinking about the state status of these institutions strictly in terms of constraints or strictly in terms of resources, but enables one to think how the two effects are inseparable. To be sure, this state status prevents state feminist institutions from resorting to the more classic means of action of social movements, such as a street demonstration or the launching of a petition. It also strongly entices them to restrain the extent of the reforms they promote depending on their perception of what is acceptable and/or credible, and imposes them to phrase their claims in a governmental language. To this extent, their state status can be described as constraining. However, it also functions as a resource, notably giving them access to means of action that are not accessible to non-governmental actors (taking part in the council of ministers, or, in most cases, taking part in inter-ministerial committees).

This distinct repertoire of contention may then be specified according to the characteristics of state feminist institutions. An important distinction must be drawn, in this perspective, between institutions that are endowed with a strictly consultative role (such as councils, committees, observatories) and “ministerial” institutions actually endowed with a policymaking role (such as ministries, secretaries of state, cabinets, administrations in charge of women’s policy). Indeed, this difference affects the level of publicity they may give to their action. The lobbying efforts deployed by ministerial type institutions largely remains within the state apparatus, being given little publicity (as suggested by the above quote by Michèle André, they notably involve direct interaction between the minister or their representatives within the council of ministers or inter-ministerial committees). On the contrary, consultative institutions may more easily publicize their critiques and demands for reforms. This may take the form of press releases, or being publicly audited by a parliamentary committee, i.e. modes of action they have in common with civil society organizations.

To sum up, as the following diagram shows, three main repertoires of contention may be distinguished, whose composition varies according to the actor’s integration within the state apparatus, the degree of publicity of the actions being inversely proportional to this integration. To be sure, the repertoire of contention we describe as characteristic of non-governmental contentious actors could, itself, be split into several more specific repertoires characteristic of different segments of this world of contention (radical groups vs lobbying
interest groups, etc.). Our focus here, as previously described, is on the two other repertoires, which are characteristic of state feminism.

Figure 1: Three repertoires of contention, inside and outside the state

**Non-governmental contentious actors (women’s autonomous associations, women’s advocacy groups in political parties, universities, trade unions, corporations, churches...)**

**Consultative state feminist institutions (councils, committees)**

**Policymaking/ministerial state feminist institutions (minister, cabinet, administration in charge of women’s policy)**

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**Conclusion: From contentious institutions to the field of women’s advocacy**

Drawing on the rich literature produced over the two last decades on women’s movements, feminism and the state, this paper has argued that the contentious dimension of state feminism collective actors should be fully taken into account. For most state feminism theorists, a definitional line remains between “the women’s movement” located in the civil society, and women’s policy instances, located within the state. Women’s policy agencies are widely considered as the allies or the relays of a women’s movement that is irreducibly located outside of the state. Against this common vision, we argue that women’s policy instances have organizational, cultural and strategic features that allow them to actively participate, by their own, to the purveying of feminist protest in contemporary societies. This argument has strong consequences with respect to the definition of the women’s movement at large. Drawing from Katzenstein and Banaszak insights on contentious politics, we argue that the definition of the “women’s movement” should not be derived, by definition, from an outside location and non-conventional tactics. Genuine feminist protest can develop inside mainstream institutions, including the state.

One possible concept for grasping the transversal dimension of women’s claim making across institutional lines is the concept of field of women’s advocacy (Bereni 2007). This
concept refers to the configuration of organizations promoting the status of women in a variety of social spheres, either inside or outside mainstream institutions. Women's policy agencies are part of the field of women's advocacy as much as women's autonomous associations and groups advocating for women in political parties, trade unions, academic institutions, religious bodies, economic organizations, etc. In this theoretical framework, “autonomous” women’s organizations, located in the “civil society”, outside mainstream institutions, are considered as one component of the field of women's advocacy, in relation with its other components. Although the multiple actors that make up the field of women's advocacy might use a variety of means of action and discourses, they are linked together in an entanglement of social networks and through a series of common discourses and practices, which make possible the emergence of cross-sectional feminist campaigns. It remains to be demonstrated empirically (in a variety of historical contexts and for a range of issues) whether women’s autonomous organizations are – or not – the primary purveyors of feminist protest compared to other actors of the field of women's advocacy. More broadly, this theoretical vision should lead to a deep challenge, from a feminist and women's movement perspective, of the very definition of social movements and contentious politics in mainstream sociology and political science.
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